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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff-Appellee, \ 
V. 1 
ROBERT T. HASTON, \ 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
\ Case No. 900021-CA 
\ Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURSIDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted second 
degree murder, a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-4-101, 76-4-102(2) and 76-5-203 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly instruct the jury as to 
what constitutes a reasonable doubt? It is the exclusive 
function of the trial court to instruct the jury on relevant law; 
and no prejudicial error occurred if it appears that the giving 
or rejection of a requested instruction would not have affected 
the outcome of the trial. State v. McCumberf 622 P.2d 353# 359 
(Utah 1985). 
Did the trial court properly limit defendant's proposed 
depraved indifference instruction? The same standard as stated 
in the preceding paragraph governs this issue. 
Were the prosecutor's remarks concerning the law 
prejudicial error? In assessing whether remarks merit reversal 
in a criminal case this Court will determine if the remark called 
to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict, and 
whether the jurors probably were influenced by the remarks. 
State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Did the trial court err in imposing firearm enhancement 
terms and restitution. The standard of reviewing enhancement 
provisions is set forth in State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601, 603 
(Utah 1984), which limits enhancement terms to five years. It is 
within the discretion of the trial court to impose sentence and 
restitution. State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203(2) (1990): 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(2) In the case of a felony of the 
second degree, for a term at not less than 
one year nor more than 15 years but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile 
or the representation of a firearm was used 
in the commission or furtherance of a felony, 
the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted for a term of one year to 
run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the 
person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(3)(a)(i), (b), (c): 
(3)(a)(1) When a person is adjudged guilty 
of criminal activity which has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution up to 
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double the amount of pecuniary damages to the 
victim or victims of the offense of which the 
defendant has pleaded guilty, is convicted, 
or to the victim of any other criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court unless the court in applying 
the criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that 
restitution is inappropriate. Whether the 
court determines that restitution is 
appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall 
make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(b) In determining whether or not to 
order restitution, or restitution which is 
complete, partial, or nominal, the court 
shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the 
defendant and the burden that payment"of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant 
to pay restitution on an installment basis or 
on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on 
the defendant of the payment of restitution 
and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the 
court determines make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the 
imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of 
sentencing allow him a full hearing on the 
issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert T. Haston, was charged with attempted 
second degree murder, a second degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. SS 76-5-203, 76-4-102(2) and 76-4-101 (1990). (R. 5-6). A 
jury found him guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced 
him to the Utah State Prison for not less than one year nor more 
than fifteen years. A firearm enhancement was added to the 
sentence. Defendant was also ordered to pay fines and 
restitution. (R. 112, 119 - 120). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early evening of July 2, 1989, defendant shot 
Leonard Tate in the chest, just below the right nipple, from a 
distance of four to five feet (T. 84-86, 114, 127). The gun 
defendant used was a late model, state of the art, Smith & Wesson 
.357 magnum (T. 230, 232, 234). At the time of the shooting, the 
gun was fully loaded with Federal Ammunition Company Hydra-Shok 
ammunition, a type of ammunition heavy enough to be considered a 
hunting round and designed to unload its energy upon impact to 
the body it strikes and not move on (T. 184-86). The resulting 
wound caused injury to the chest, ribs, lungs, liver and 
diaphragm of the victim (T. 28-29). When the victim arrived at 
the hospital he was bleeding to death, and a five to six hour 
operation was necessary to save his life (T. 27-29). 
After the shooting, defendant attempted to leave 
Scotty's Motel, where the shooting occurred, but was physically 
stopped by the motel manager and taken to the motel office until 
the police arrived and took him into custody (T. 50, 58-59). 
During the period of time immediately following the shooting, 
defendant gave several different versions of the incident. He 
stated that the victim had grabbed the gun and when defendant 
grabbed it back, it went off (T. 37-38, 166); that the victim had 
accidentally shot himself (T. 53); that the shooting was an 
accident (T. 154); and that the shooting was an accident, in that 
he did not mean to shoot the victim (T. 164). 
At trial, defendant, the victim, and David Ezzedine, an 
acquaintance and eyewitness to the shooting, testified to 
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spending much of the day and a half prior to the shooting 
drinking and unwinding at the Se Rancho Motel (Aug. 1) and at 
Scotty's Motel (Aug. 2) away from the men's shelter, where the 
men were staying. Approximately five to six cases of beer were 
purchased during that period, and defendant also bought a fifth 
of peppermint schnapps (T. 78, 95, 100, 207). Four other people 
drank some of the beer (T. 78, 100-03, 213-14), and one of those 
people also brought some vodka (T. 215). 
The victim testified that at about 4:00 p.m., about two 
hours before the shooting, he had been lying asleep at the motel, 
heard a hammer click and looked up to find defendant pointing a 
gun at his head (T. 121-22). Earlier in the day defendant had 
been carrying the gun around fully loaded, swinging it around and 
popping bullets in and out. At that time the victim had told him 
to put it away before he hurt somebody (T. 120-21). Both the 
victim and Mr. Ezzeddine testified that just before the shooting 
defendant and the victim had an argument about the amount of beer 
left, which resulted in defendant retrieving his gun, grasping 
the gun with both hands and pointing it at the victim. When the 
victim asserted that defendant did not have the nerve to shoot 
him, defendant pulled the trigger (T. 84-86, 127). 
Defendant gave a conflicting version of the shooting 
incident, stating that he was trying to load the gun so that they 
would have protection in case of a burglary when the gun slipped 
and went off (T. 222). He testified that he was in a state of 
shock and disbelief at the shooting, grabbed the gun and put it 
in his gym bag and went to the office. He took the gun with him 
so that it would not be stolen (T. 226-27). Defendant made no 
attempt to aid the victim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to what 
constitutes a reasonable doubt. 
The trial court properly limited defendant's proposed 
depraved indifference instruction because its deletion of two 
sentences as surplus was solidly within its discretion. 
The trial court properly cured the prosecutor's 
remarks, and the jurors could not have been influenced by them. 
The trial court erred in imposing a six year firearm 
enhancement and properly imposed restitution, a fine, surcharge 
and recoupment costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
On appeal defendant offers numerous bases for finding 
the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction erroneous. He 
asserts that the instruction misstated the law and permitted 
improper inferences concerning the State's burden of proof (Br. 
of App. at 12); that the instruction failed to adequately define 
the appropriate standard (Br. of App. at 13); and that the 
instruction allowed a jury to convict him on a standard of proof 
below the due process protections of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution (Br. of App. at 13-14). At 
trial defendant objected to the instruction only on the basis of 
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two recent Utah Supreme Court cases, State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 
1375 (Utah 1989), and State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 
1989). Failure to raise issues at the trial court bars 
defendant from raising the issues for the first time on appeal. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326,.327-28 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1989); State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 
252, 254 (Utah 1983). Therefore, the State will only address 
defendant's argument based on the Ireland and Johnson cases. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has expressed concern as 
to the inclusion in reasonable doubt instructions of certain 
terms or phrases, the Court has never mandated that particular 
language be included. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380; Johnson, 774 
P.2d at 1147-49, (concurring opinions of Stewart, J. and 
Zimmerman, J.); State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980). 
Instead, the standard remains that jury instructions must be 
Defendant's entire objection at trial was as follows: 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, and I did have one 
other exception, and that was to Instruction 
No. 7 which the Court gave on the definition 
of — in part of beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that standard. I also proposed an 
instruction on that concept and took language 
directly from the State v. Ireland and State 
v. Johnson cases which are cases that came 
down from the Utah Supreme Court earlier this 
year. Both of those cases indicated that the 
previously used or generally used reasonable 
doubt instruction did not accurately state 
the law, and I took language directly from 
those cases which I think describes clearly 
to a jury what that standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt means, and object to the 
Court giving the instruction that I think was 
the one that the Court itself proposed rather 
than the one that I proposed. 
(R. 312-13.) 
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construed as a whole; and, a conviction will be overturned only 
if a defendant can show that he was prejudiced by the instruction 
such that the outcome of the case would have likely been 
different. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980); 
United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (no 
constitutional infringement occurs where instructions as a whole 
properly instructed the jury as to defendant's presumption of 
innocence and the government's burden of proof). 
Further, it is the exclusive province of the trial 
court to instruct the jury on relevant law. 
Accordingly, the judge may, over the 
objection of the defendant's counsel, give 
any instruction that is in proper form, 
states the law correctly, and does not 
prejudice the defendant. State v. Piper, 113 
Ariz. 390, 393, 555 P.2d 636, 639 (1976). 
However, all instructions are subject to the 
general and overreaching rule that the judge 
must make it clear to the jury that the 
defendant has "no particular burden of proof 
but [is] entitled to an acquittal if there 
[is] any basis in the evidence from either 
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant [is] guilty of the 
offense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 
(Utah 1980).... 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1980). 
As noted in State v. Johnsonf jury instructions must be 
construed as a whole. Ld. at 1146. Here, the trial court fully 
and correctly instructed that defendant was entitled to a 
presumption of innocence (Instruction 7; R. 86), that the State 
carried the burden of proving all essential elements of the crime 
(Instructions 3, 11, and 12; R. 83, 90-91, 92-93) and that the 
State must prove that defendant acted with the requisite intent 
(Instructions 11, 13-15, 18; R. 90-91, 94-96, 99). 
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Turning to the language of the reasonable doubt 
instruction itself, it is equally clear that the instruction was 
proper. The trial court instructed the jury that: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the 
burden is upon the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
require proof to an absolute certainty. Now 
by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable 
in view of all the evidence. It must be 
reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a 
wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it and obviates all 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would 
entertain, and it must arise from the 
evidence or the lack of the evidence in this 
case. 
(Instruction No. 7; R. 86). 
The first paragraph of the trial court's instruction is 
identical to the first paragraph of defendant's requested 
instruction. The language is a correct and unequivocal statement 
of defendant's presumption of innocence. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 
1380. 
The first line of the second paragraph is again 
identical to defendant's requested instruction and merely 
restates, again unequivocally, that the State has the burden of 
proof. 
o_ 
The second sentence, "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not require proof to an absolute certainty," must be read 
with the fourth sentence, "It must be a reasonable doubt and not 
a doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly 
speculative possibility." Together, the language establishes, as 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, that "a fanciful or wholly 
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1149 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the result). The language is not the same as the 
"possible or imaginary" language disapproved of by the Court in 
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380, but was altered to comply with the 
case law. 
The third sentence of the second paragraph, "Now by 
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence," is identical to 
language used and approved of in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 
572 (Utah 1987). Although defendant objects to that instruction 
as "circular," (Br. of App. at 16), it is identical to the 
instruction defendant herself offered. (See Defendant's 
Requested Instruction paragraph 2; R. 71-72). Defendant has no 
basis to object to its inclusion. 
The first part of the fifth sentence, "Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the 
mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it. . .," is identical to that approved of 
in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 572-572, and favorably reviewed 
in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1145-1146. The second part of 
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the sentence, "and obviates all reasonable doubt," is in 
conformity with Justice Stewart's requirement that -the 
instruction should specifically state the State's proof must 
obviate all reasonable doubt•" Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
The last sentence of the instruction, MA reasonable 
doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, 
and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence 
in the case," has been approved of in both Tillman, 750 P.2d at 
572-573, and Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1145-46. Again, it is 
identical to the language requested by defendant. (See 
Defendant's Requested Instruction, paragraph 2; R. 71-72). 
Taken as a whole, it is clear that the trial court's 
instructions to the jury retained the burden of proof on the 
State to prove all elements of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The reasonable doubt instruction contained no erroneous 
language and properly stated the law. Since the jury was 
properly instructed, defendant was not entitled to an instruction 
which was merely redundant or repetitive of the court's. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146 (quoting State v. Wilks, 25 Utah 2d 22, 
25, 474 P.2d 733, 735 (1970)). Even if the court's instruction 
required more appropriate language, 6uch error would be harmless 
in light of the totality of the jury instructions and ample 
evidence against defendant. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146; State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-920 (Utah 1987). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE STANDARD. 
At trial the following "depraved indifferenceH 
instruction (Instruction 13) was given to the jury: 
Depraved indifference refers not to mental 
subjective state but to the objective 
circumstances under which the conduct causing 
the injury occurred. Reckless conduct which 
has an incidental tragic result will not 
suffice. At the time of the act, the 
defendant must know of the risk. Knowledge 
here refers to the nature of the conduct or 
the circumstances surrounding it or both, but 
not the result produced by the conduct. The 
circumstances of the injury when objectively 
viewed must evidence a depraved indifference 
to human life. 
(Instruction 13; R. 94). 
In giving that instruction the trial court modified 
defendant's proposed instruction by deleting the following two 
sentences: 
In other words, there must be a knowing doing 
of an uncalled for act in callous disregard 
of its likely harmful effect which is so 
heinous as to be equivalent to a "specific 
intent" to kill. Examples of this might be 
unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity or 
acts of a high degree of wantonness. 
(R. 78). The court reasoned "that the instruction as modified 
provided the essential elements insofar as the definition of 
depraved indifference is concerned, that the 'in other words' 
language or clause which was stricken by the court was . . . 
surplusage . . . ." (T. 312.) 
Defendant's sole objection at trial was that the 
sentences deleted from Instruction 13 complied with the 
directives given by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bolsinqer, 
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699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), and gave the jury the knowledge needed 
to evaluate a depraved indifference state of mind (R. 311). On 
appeal defendant attacks as "vague" both Instruction 13 and 
Instruction 11, which set forth the statutory elements of 
attempted second degree murder. He asks this Court to evaluate 
each instruction line by line to determine whether they, when 
read in concert, satisfy the standard for a depraved indifference 
instruction articulated in State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 
(Utah 1988). No objection to the adequacy of Instruction 11 was 
made below; therefore, it should not be part of this Court's 
consideration now. State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 
1987) ("The usual rule is that '[n]o party may assign as error 
any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.'H 
(quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)); State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 
995 (Utah 1989). 
The only matter before this Court is whether the trial 
court erred in deleting the last two sentences of Instruction 13 
as surplusage. Defendant himself acknowledges that the sentences 
in question are "explanatory portions" of the instruction (Br. of 
App. at 25). The first phrase of each sentence, "in other words" 
and "examples of this might be," indicate that they were meant to 
be parenthetical and illustrative of the definition previously 
stated. The remainder of the first sentence is taken directly 
from dicta in Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1220. The phrase that there 
"must be a knowing doing of an uncalled-for act" is a restatement 
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of two prior sentences of the given instruction "At the time, the 
defendant roust know of the risk. Knowledge here refers to the 
nature of the conduct or the circumstances or both • • . •" The 
first phrase, "in callous disregard of its likely harmful effect 
which is so heinous as to be equivalent to a 'specific intent' to 
killing" may be misleading in light of current Utah law. The 
Utah Supreme Court observed in State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 
(Utah 1987), "[t]he terms 'general intent' and 'specific intent' 
are no longer used in our present criminal code which refers to 
'culpable mental states,'" thus seemingly rejecting use of those 
terms as inapplicable to the current criminal code. Although the 
phrase in question was quoted with approval in Bolsinqer and 
Standiford, the Court did not incorporate an "equivalent to a 
'specific intent' to kill" standard in its suggestions concerning 
a depraved indifference jury instruction. In Standiford, the 
Court stated, in pertinent part, that the jury should be 
instructed that it must find "that the conduct [of defendant] 
evidenced an utter callousness and indifference toward human 
life." Ici. at 264. Although defendant equates the Court's 
charge there with his proposed instruction (Br. of App. at 28), 
in fact, the suggested instruction falls far short of the 
"equivalent to a 'specific intent' to kill" standard defendant 
urges. Therefore, that language was properly excluded by the 
trial court. 
The second sentence of defendant's proposed 
instruction, "[ejxamples of this might be unmitigated wickedness, 
extreme inhumanity or acts of a high degree of wantonness," is a 
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highly subjective litany of general evils and adds nothing of 
substance. Its inclusion would not have assisted the jury in 
defining or applying a depraved indifference standard. 
Defendant further argues that the evidence fails to 
support a finding of "depraved indifference." (Br. of App. at 
30). On appeal, this Court will view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 
422, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985). A verdict is reversed "only when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987). 
In the instant case, the jury returned a general 
verdict finding defendant guilty of attempted second degree 
murder (R. 112). The jury had three variations by which to find 
defendant guilty: 1) that defendant attempted to unlawfully 
cause the death of the victim, and that such attempt was made 
either intentionally or knowingly; 2) that defendant 
intentionally attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the 
victim by committing an act clearly dangerous to human life which 
could have caused his death; or 3) that defendant, acting under 
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to life, engaged 
in conduct which created a grave risk of death to defendant or 
which could have caused his death. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(1990) (R. 90). Here, the evidence of defendant's guilt was 
overwhelming. The jury could have convicted him on any of the 
possible variations of the charge. A brief review of the 
evidence will so demonstrate. 
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Defendant shot the victim straight through the torso 
from a distance of less than five feet using ammunition which 
qualified as a hunting round and was designed to unload maximum 
kinetic energy on impact and thereby inflict maximum damage on 
its target (T. 114, 125, 184-87). The gun used to shoot the 
victim was an expensive, top-of-the-line Smith & Wesson, in near 
new condition and could not be accidentally discharged (T. 184, 
188). Both the victim and another eyewitness to the shooting, 
David Ezzeddine, testified unequivocally that defendant, after a 
brief argument with the victim, gripped the gun with both hands, 
stretched his arms out, raised the gun, pointed it at the 
victim's chest, pulled the hammer back, looked straight at the 
victim and shot (T. 82-84, 126, 145-46). Mr. Ezzeddine said 
defendant's eyes looked "cold" and "eerie" (T. 85). Another 
witness who saw defendant within several minutes of the shooting 
testified that defendant was nonchalant and exhibited no remorse 
over the shooting (T. 69). Defendant himself, though stating 
that he was extremely intoxicated at the time he shot the weapon, 
was able to remember many details of the day, including what he 
had done and conversations he had had with numerous people (T. 
216-21). He also testified to the care he purportedly had taken 
to check the gun's cylinder and action to make sure it was empty 
and safe before showing it to Mr. Ezzeddine and the victim 
shortly before the shooting (T. 221). He was able to remember 
that his concern for Mr. Ezzeddine and Mr. Ezzeddinefs fear of 
being robbed, a fear which Mr. Ezzeddine did not admit to in his 
testimony, prompted him to take the ammunition from his watch 
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pocket# load the cylinder, switch the gun to his left hand, and 
check the action (T. 222). However, he could not remember where 
the victim was or even how he himself had been sitting on the bed 
(T. 222). His testimony was conveniently vague when it came to 
the event of the shooting, was self-serving and incredible. 
After the shooting defendant had the presence of mind to try to 
cover himself, giving police officers several different accounts 
of what happened (T. 37-38, 53, 154, 164-66). The only 
consistency in his explanation was his assertion that he was not 
responsible for the shooting. The jury only deliberated an hour 
and a quarter before finding him guilty (R. 117). 
In light of the ample evidence against defendant, the 
jury could have found that defendant knowingly or intentionally 
attempted to kill the victim or that defendant intentionally 
attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the victim by 
committing an act clearly dangerous to human life. That being 
the case, there necessarily would be sufficient evidence that 
defendant was guilty of depraved indifference murder, and "[a]ny 
error in the instructions was harmless." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 
264. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 168-69 (Utah 1987). The jury's 
verdict should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CURED THE 
PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS, AND THE JURORS COULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THEM. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor misstated the law 
in his closing argument and that the trial court failed to cure 
the error because the jury instructions, to which the jury was 
referred, were misleading. 
In assessing whether remarks made by counsel were so 
objectionable as to merit reversal in a criminal case, this Court 
will apply the following test: 
(1) Did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict; and (2) were the 
jurors, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by the 
remarks? 
State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
State v, Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989); State v. Troy, 
688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 
513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973)). 
The prosecution's statement, the defense's objection 
and the trial court's response are as follows: 
MR. COPE: [prosecutor] 
. . . 
There are three ways that . . . 
[justice] can be achieved. The State has 
offered you each and every one of the three. 
The State suggests that you may find . . . 
[defendant] guilty each of the three ways, 
but any of the three ways is sufficient to 
find him guilty. When you read the 
Instructions, you will note that voluntary 
intoxication, Instruction 20, does not apply 
at all to the third way [depraved 
indifference] that the government suggests 
that this may be found guilty. Doesn't 
matter how drunk he was. Doesn't matter how 
drunk people were that he shot. 
MS. REMAL: [defense attorney] Your Honor, I 
have to object. I think that that misstates 
the law. 
MR. COPE: I think it's a fair comment on the 
evidence and also upon the law and the 
instruction, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I'm going to 
advise the jury that they've been given the 
law by this court. They can look at those 
instructions and interpret them themselves as 
to what it means, and if counsel, as I've 
stated previously, misstates that law or 
facts to you, you must rely on your own 
judgment. 
MR. COPE: Fair enough. You decide what 
Instruction 20 means. You decide what 
applicability it has. That's your job. 
(T. 302-03). 
In applying the first prong of the Lopez test, this 
Court must determine whether the prosecutor's statement 
concerning the effect of voluntary intoxication on the element of 
depraved indifference was a misstatement of the law. Although 
defendant states that "voluntary intoxication i^ a defense to 
second degree murder" (Br. of App. at 35), a correct reading of 
the applicable authorities indicates that voluntary intoxication 
"may beM a defense to that charge. Standiford, 767 P.2d at 265. 
In order to utilize voluntary intoxication as a defense, a jury 
must determine that the degree of intoxication is so great as to 
negate the existence of the necessary mental state. See State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89-90 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 
(1982) ("[F]or . . . [defendant] to have been successful, he had 
to prove much more than he had been drinking. It was necessary 
to show that his mind had been affected to such an extent that he 
did not have the capacity to form the requisite . . . intent or 
purpose . • . . " ) . Although the trial court declined to rule on 
whether the prosecutor misstated the law, (T. 318) the State now 
concedes that voluntary intoxication may be a defense to a 
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depraved indifference element and that the prosecutor's statement 
to the contrary was error, thus satisfying the first prong of the 
Lopez test. 
However, in applying the second prong of the Lopez 
test, it is not possible that the jurors could have been 
influenced significantly by the remarks, so the remarks did not 
constitute reversible error. Defendant does not even allege that 
they did. First, defendant's counsel immediately objected to the 
prosecution's statement. Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45. The trial court 
responded appropriately that it had instructed the jury on the 
law and that it should look to the instruction and interpret the 
law (T. 303). Specifically, the jury was directed that the trial 
judge would instruct them on the law applicable to the case 
(Instruction 5, R. 84). It was given the elements of the crime 
of attempted second degree murder (Instruction 11, R. 90-1) and 
was instructed that if the evidence failed to establish elements 
of that charge, the jury could consider a lesser included 
offense. Ici. It was given the elements of the lesser included 
offense. (Instruction 12, R. 92-3). It was instructed on the 
definition of depraved indifference (Instruction 13, R. 94) and 
as to the definition of voluntary intoxication and the degree of 
defendant's burden in asserting that defense (Instructions 20, 
21; R. 101, 102). 
Second, proof of defendant's guilt was extremely 
strong, and thus the prosecutor's remark will not be presumed 
prejudicial. Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45. (See review of evidence, 
under Point II, supra). No reasonable likelihood exists that the 
jurors were affected by the prosecutor's comments. Id. 
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Finally, defendant has not utilized the Lopez standard 
for assessing a prosecutor's comments but instead has chosen to 
attack jury Instructions 20 and 21 as being misleading and 
improper• However, defendant cannot avail himself of that 
argument. He did not timely object to Instruction 20 at trial 
and is thereby barred from raising that issue on appeal. Medina, 
738 P.2d at 1023. Instruction 21 is defendant's own instruction, 
given verbatim as he requested it (R. 77). He cannot now object 
to his own statement of the law. To do so is inviting error, and 
defendant cannot take such advantage. Straka v. Voyles, 69 Utah 
123, 252 P. 677, 679 (1927). See also Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 
2d 342, 345-46, 366 P.2d 603, 608 (1961); Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah 
265, 273-74, 17 P.2d 272, 276 (1932). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A SIX-YEAR 
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT AND PROPERLY IMPOSED 
RESTITUTION, A FINE, SURCHARGE AND RECOUPMENT 
COSTS. 
A. The Trial Court Could Properly Impose A Maximum 
Term Of Only Five Years For Use Of A Firearm. 
The trial court, in sentencing defendant, imposed 
enhancement terms of one-year and zero to five years, to be 
served consecutively with defendant's one to fifteen year term 
(R. 119-20). Defendant argues that the cumulative six-year 
enhancement term exceeds the maximum allowable enhancement term 
of five years. The State concedes that the trial court 
erroneously imposed a six-year enhancement term. 
In State v. Willet, 694 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the firearm enhancement statute to 
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provide a maximum enhancement term of five years. See also State 
v, Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The State, 
therefore, requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and remand the case to the trial court with the instruction to 
impose an enhancement term of five years. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Imposed Restitution. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of 
$64,098.62. In so ordering, the trial court stated: 
I will direct that Mr. Haston pay 
restitution in the amount set forth of 
$64,098.62. I am of the view that to order 
otherwise would be viewed as, and could be 
viewed as, some sort of condonation of the 
conduct of Mr. Haston causing the serious, 
grievous bodily injury to the victim of this 
crime. It's a miracle that he didn't die as 
a result of the crime that was committed here 
and the wounds that he suffered at Mr. 
Haston's hands. That jury did not believe 
the story that it was accidental, nor does 
the Court believe that it was accidental. 
(T. 323.) 
I have, for purposes of the record, 
considered the appropriateness of the 
restitution and the factors set forth in 76-
3201. [sic] It is my view that Mr. Haston 
does receive funds with which the restitution 
and other fines that I have imposed could be 
paid upon, and may well make substantial 
inroads into that obligation that Mr. Haston 
has created for the taxpayers of this state, 
as well as the victim of the crime. 
(T. 324.) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (1990): 
[T]he Court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to the victim or victims of 
the offense of which the defendant . . . is 
convicted . . . unless the court in applying 
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the criteria in section 3(b) of this chapter, 
finds that restitution is inappropriate. If 
the Court determines that restitution is 
appropriate or inappropriate, the Court shall 
make the reasons or the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(Emphasis added.) Section 3(b) reads as follows: 
(b) In determining whether or not to order 
restitution, or restitution which is 
complete, partial, or nominal, the court 
shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the 
defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to 
the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to 
pay restitution on an installment basis or 
on other conditions to be fixed by the 
court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the 
defendant of the payment of restitution 
and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the 
court determines make restitution in 
appropriate. 
It lies within the solid discretion of the trial court 
to impose sentence and restitution. State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 
417, 420 (Utah 1987). Upon conviction of a crime which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to the sentence 
imposed, the trial court is statutorily mandated to order the 
payment of restitution unless the court finds restitution to be 
inappropriate. Ijd. In light of the strong mandate to impose 
restitution, the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering defendant to pay full restitution, and the trial court 
stated its reasons for imposing restitution, as directed by 
statute. It should be noted in that respect that a trial court 
is not directed by section 76-3-201(3)(a) to make specific 
findings of fact supporting its decision to order restitution, 
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just that it state its reasons for doing so. In addition, 
although not specifically stated by the trial court, the record 
as a whole indicates that defendant, shortly before the shooting, 
had had a motorcycle and a van and other belongings, all of which 
he had sold (T. 234). In the three months prior to the shooting 
defendant had purchased four guns (R. 248). Defendant also 
received a monthly General Assistance check from the federal 
government. 
At defendant's sentencing he lodged no objection to the 
imposition, amount or distribution as ordered and did not request 
a hearing on the issue as provided by section 76-3-201(3)(c). 
Prior to the trial court's imposition of the restitution, 
defendant argued generally that defendant could not afford 
restitution and asked that the court not impose it (T. 321-22). 
However, that pre-imposition argument did not preserve the issue 
for appeal, and defendant then waived his right to challenge the 
order. Snyder, 747 P.2d at 421. The trial court properly 
ordered restitution. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Ordered A Fine, Surcharge 
And Recoupment Fee. 
Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion 
in imposing a fine, surcharge and recoupment fee on defendant. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-302 (1990), a person may be 
sentenced to pay a fine of up to $10,000 for a second degree 
felony. It is within the discretion of the trial court to impose 
the fine. See Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-301.5(5) (1990). 
As noted previously the trial court considered 
defendant's financial capabilities when ordering restitution and 
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found that he would be able to make substantial inroads into the 
court-imposed obligation (T. 324). 
The imposition of a 25% surcharge on a fine in a 
criminal case is mandatory. Utah Code Ann. S 63-63a-l (Supp. 
1990). The court may order defendant to pay costs, including 
attorneys fees of counsel assigned to represent defendant. Utah 
Code Ann. SS 77-32a-l and -2 (1990). A defendant who has been 
ordered to pay costs may# at any time, petition the court that 
sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid 
portion thereof. The court may limit all or part of the amount 
due in costs or modify the method of payment if it finds that 
payment of the amount due will impose undue hardship on the 
defendant. Utah Code Ann. S 77-32a-4 (1990). Defendant has not 
availed himself of this statutory remedy and should do so before 
bringing the matter before this Court. The trial court acted 
properly within its discretion in imposing the fine, surcharge 
and defense costs. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and 
sentence should be affirmed in all respects except for the six-
year firearm enhancement term imposed by the trial court, which 
should be reduced to five years. 
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